ABSTRACT This paper empirically investigates the role of trade, remittances, and institutions in economic development in a large sample of developing countries using recently developed instruments for all these variables. Both cross-country (over 30 years) and dynamic panel data (over 5-year periods) regressions of growth rates on instrumented trade, remittances, and institutions provide evidence of a significant impact of trade, institutions, and remittances on growth. While institutions foster growth, remittances hamper it. The effect of trade on growth is positive in cross-sectional regressions but ambiguous in dynamic panel data regressions. These results are indicative of a more important role for trade in explaining growth in the very long run compared with over shorter horizons.
Introduction
What are the fundamental determinants of per capita income growth? For sometime, many economists have attempted to answer this question. Although there is still an ongoing debate on the answer, most economists refer to institutions, openness, and remittances as some of the main factors affecting economic growth.
There is a long and distinguished line of literature that places institutions at the center of analysis. In this respect, institutions, especially in the form of property rights protection and less distortionary policies, affect incentives to invest to achieve desirable economic outcomes (North, 1990) . This has been supported by coefficients of these variables are even larger (in terms of magnitude) as compared to previous ordinary least squares results. This indicates that all these factors are important in predicting growth in the long run: trade and institutions foster growth, but remittances hamper it. Although there may exist multicollinearity in the second stage regressions, this problem is not so severe.
This paper next turns to the increase in growth in developing countries over the last three decades to see how much growth can be explained by improved institutional quality, greater trade volumes, and changes in remittance flow. To this aim, it estimates dynamic regressions of 5-year changes in log level of GDP per capita on its lagged variable, log difference of trade shares, log difference of remittance shares, and difference in measures of institutional quality using a dynamic panel data technique. To control for possible reverse causation from growth to changes in trade, remittances, and institutions, this paper utilizes lagged log levels of these variables as their instruments. The results obtained indicate a strongly significant and economically relevant effect of changes in trade, remittances, and level of institutional quality on growth. In other words, there is enough evidence of the important roles of these factors in both the long and the short run.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 documents the crosssectional evidence on trade, remittances, and institutions. Section 3 presents the results of the dynamic regressions. Section 4 ends the paper with some concluding remarks. Detailed variable description, data sources, and a list of countries in the sample can be found in the Appendices at the end of the paper.
Remittances, Trade, Institutions, and Growth in a Cross-section of Countries
This paper starts by examining the effects of trade, remittances, and institutions on per capita income growth in a cross-section of countries. To capture growth performance of countries, the log-difference of per capita GDP is regressed on measures of international market size, remittance inflow, and institutional quality:
log Y iT − log Y i0 = α 0 + α 1 log Y i0 + α 2 log TS iT + α 3 log RS iT + α 4 I iT
where Y iT is real GDP per capita at year T, Y i0 is real GDP per capita at the beginning of the period, TS iT is the trade-GDP ratio, RS iT is the remittances-GDP ratio, I iT is the quality level of institutions, and X iT is a vector of other explanatory variables. In this study, the growth framework is chosen ahead of the levels framework, which is used extensively in the literature, to capture the conditional convergence effect (through the log of initial income) which is often found in empirical growth models, either Neo-classical models, e.g. Mankiw et al. (1992) , or models of international technological transfer, e.g. Dowrick and Rogers (2002) . 1 An additional 394 T. Le advantage of this approach is that it helps overcome two problems of the levels approach, as indicated by Dollar and Kraay (2003) , which cause endogeneity through reverse causality and omitted variable bias. 2 There is a voluminous number of existing papers that examine the effects of institutional quality on level of per capita income such as Hall and Jones (1999) , Kaufmann et al. (1999) , Acemoglu et al. (2001) , Dollar and Kraay (2003) , and Rodrik et al. (2004) . Frankel and Romer (1999) use the levels framework to estimate the effect of trade integration on growth. Meanwhile, Chami et al. (2005) and Catrinescu et al. (2006) investigate the impact of remittances on economic development, using the growth framework. All these suggest a good case for the importance of the above-mentioned factors on a country's economic performance. Apparently, property right protection and fair enforcement of contracts can affect the incentives to invest/work and innovate. In addition, the access to international trade and remittance income may also affect these incentives and, hence, growth.
To measure the quality of the institution, this paper employs the aggregate index of economic freedom of the Fraser Institute (Gwarteny & Lawson, 2007) . This composite indicator, which draws on survey data from the Global Competitiveness Report and the International Country Risk Guide, measures the extent to which institutions in a country provide secure protection of property rights, assure fair enforcement of contracts and a stable monetary environment, allow free exchange with foreigners, and lift restrictions on entry into occupations and business activities. It is computed for 123 countries in the base year of 2000, and, by construction, ranging from 0 to 10 where 10 implies the highest institutional quality. This paper recognizes several other available measures of institutional quality in the literature, for example, the composite index of Kaufmann et al. (2003) , the anti-expropriation index of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and the rule of law index of Rodrik et al. (2004) . However, these data sets have a very limited timeseries dimension, which can hardly be used for panel estimation. As a result, the economic freedom index is chosen for its wide range of coverage, long time-series dimension, and broad scope of definition. 3 This paper measures real GDP per capita for the period 1970-2005 in 1990 dollars using data from the United Nations Statistics Division. Human capital, the only control variable used in this paper, is proxied by the fraction of adult population completing post-secondary education from the Barro and Lee (2000) database. Trade openness is measured by total trade as a fraction of GDP. These data come from Summer, Heston, and Bettina's Penn World Tables version 6.2.
If economies are in their steady states, the addition of the lagged dependent variable should add no explanatory power. 2 In addition, from equation (1), it can be easily shown that the levels regression is nested within the growth regression. Hence, the growth framework is more general than the levels framework. 3 Recently, Marshall et al. (2008) construct Polity IV data on qualities of democratic and autocratic authority for 162 countries over the period . This data set measures key issues such as qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, political competition, and changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. Although this data set is focused more on the political side than the economic side of institutions, it is a potentially good measure of institutional quality for future research on the issue. Table 1 provides results estimated by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for a cross-section of countries in the period 1970-2000. In the first column, average growth of GDP per capita is regressed on the logarithm of the initial GDP per capita level in 1970 and on the logarithm of the education variable. In the next columns, each time, one variable on trade openness, remittances, and institutions, is added separately and finally all are summed in the regressions. It can be seen that the coefficient on the initial income term is always negative and highly significant, which confirms the convergence story of the Neo-classical growth school of thought. Similarly, the impact of education on growth is positive and significant. This result supports theories of growth in which human capital generates significant technological externalities as per Lucas (1988) and is also in line with empirical evidence of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) among others. Turning to the variables of interest, it is found that the signs of trade openness and institutions are, as expected, positive, and statistically significant. Throughout the table, the coefficients on remittances are negatively and statistically significant or close to being so. This supports the perception of the remittance opponents who contend that remittances could have a net harmful impact on national economic growth because they have the potential to fuel inflation, disadvantage the tradable sector by appreciating the domestic currency, and reduce incentives to work as receiving households can opt to live off of foreign transfer rather than by working. Overall, results obtained indicate that countries with stronger institution, more integration (in trade), and lower inflow of remittances are likely to grow faster.
However, as discussed extensively in the literature, there are some potential problems with the OLS regressions of this kind. The first is the endogeneity of the interested variables due to reverse causality. Countries may have good institutions because they are rich (the 'halo effects,' as per Dollar & Kraay, 2003) , and rich countries tend to trade more. In addition, as remittances are more likely a compensation for unfavorable economic conditions, such as low output, poor countries tend to receive a large amount of remittances relative to their GDP. The second problem is the likely measurement error of subjective institutional quality. 5 To address these problems, this paper employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure using instruments used previously in the literature. In order to preserve as large a sample as possible, this paper uses legal origin and the religious composition of the population (percentages of Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and other religions) as suggested by La Porta et al. (1999) as instruments for institutions. These instruments are intended to capture the impact of colonial origin on institutional quality. 6 Acemoglu et al. (2001) suggest settler mortality as an appealing instrument but this is only available for a smaller number of countries in the sample considered in this study. To instrument trade, this paper uses the Frankel and Romer (1999) measure of fitted values of trade predicted by a gravity model. As for remittances (as share of GDP), following Chami et al. (2005) , this paper instruments the variable by income gap with the US. These instrumental variables have been demonstrated to perform fairly well in the sense of producing strong second stage results (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; Chami et al., 2005) . The results of the two-stage least squares estimates are reported in Table 2 . Panel A of Table 2 presents all regressions undertaken in Table 1 , using an instrumental variable (IV) technique. All regressions include an unreported constant. It is found that all variables are significant in the intuitive direction. While trade and institutions affect growth positively, the impact of remittances on growth is always negative. The coefficients of trade share, remittance share, and institutions in the IV estimations are generally larger (in absolute value) than in the corresponding OLS estimation. This suggests that the endogeneity problem causes great bias in the OLS estimates. All regressions confirm the importance of institutions, trade openness, and workers' remittances in explaining the cross-countries variation in development. 7 It can be seen that the main findings of Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003) also hold in this sample. Per capita GDP growth is highly and positively correlated with access to foreign markets (measured by trade as a share of GDP), especially in regressions (5) and (8). The results in column (2) say that an increase in the log of trade share by one unit leads to an increase in growth of 17.9% over 30 years or roughly 0.6% per annum. In column 3, it is found that remittances exert a negative impact on growth with an estimated coefficient of −0.230. This means that if log of remittance share increases by one unit, income growth will be lower by 23% in 30 years or 0.76% a year. This result supports the findings of Chami et al. (2005) . The positive role of institutions to economic performance, as found in many previous papers, such as Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) , is also confirmed in this paper, as column 4. Here, a unit (positive) shock to the institutional quality equation results in an increase in income growth of 58.7% over 30 years which is equivalent to 1.93% annually. To examine the partial effects of trade, remittances, and institutions, this paper combines these specifications in the rest columns of the table. Regressions in these columns provide significant coefficients with intuitive signs on all the interested variables. 
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The first-stage regressions as reported in panel B also offer interesting results. In all first stage regressions, while the lagged income variable does not show significant impact, education has positive effects on trade volume, remittance inflow as share of GDP, and institutions. The finding about the positive role of education is in line with Glaeser et al. (2004) view that a better education system leads to more benign polity, more dialogue than violence, more law and order and democratic accountability, and more political stability. It also confirms that more human capital enables countries to benefit more from trade. In addition, the hypothesis that higher level of education will give (migrant) workers working overseas better opportunities to find higher income jobs and then send more money back home is supported by results of this paper. Besides education, there are other factors that influence interested variables. In the first-stage regression for trade share, the fitted trade instrument has a significant coefficient. In the specification for remittance share, legal origin, fitted openness, and income gap with the US all strongly predict remittances. Meanwhile, only legal origin has strong explanatory power for institutions. Table 3 illustrates the relationships among openness, remittance inflow, and institutions. Trade, remittances, and institutional quality are separately regressed on income at the beginning of the period and education and on each other. The way of instrumenting the endogenous variables is the same as before. While it is possible that there exist non-linear relationships among these variables, this paper tries to keep the specifications as simple and linear as in all baseline specifications. The OLS regressions indicate that trade openness exerts a significant and positive impact on remittances but remittances do not significantly affect trade. Like trade, remittances do not significantly induce institutions. The impacts of institutions on remittances and trade are insignificant. In the IV regressions, institutions do not significantly affect trade and remittances and are not affected by these factors either. However, trade and remittances are found to have a significant and positive effect on each other. This confirms the remittance supporters' view that remittances may be a good source of finance for imports and to some extent, trade and remittances are complementary in the economic development process. However, the overall impact of remittances on economic performance is found to be negative as in Table 2 . Results in Table 3 indicate that there may be multicollinearity among these variables although it is not so severe. 8 The highest value of R-squared in the first stage regressions is 0.399 (in the trade equation), which indicates that there is no perfect linear relationship among the right-hand side variables in the second stage regressions of the instrumental variables. To get more informative results about the roles of trade, remittances, and institutions, it may be better to make use of a dynamic framework. This will be addressed in the next section. All regressions include an unreported constant. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are denoted respectively by * * * , * * , and * . The first stage IV estimates are the same as those provided in Panel B of Table 2 .
Remittances, Trade, Institution, and Growth in a Dynamic Framework
In section 2, cross-sectional regressions showed that very long-run growth is significantly affected by the changes in the intensity of trade and remittances and the level of institutional quality. A disadvantage of those cross-sectional regressions is that it is difficult to separate the pure effects of those variables from potential unobserved factors that explain differences in growth rates across countries but vary very little with time, such as geographical or climate conditions. To overcome this limitation, in this section, a dynamic framework relating growth rates of real GDP per capita over time to changes in variables of interest will be utilized. For a start, the following cross-country regression is considered:
Trade, Remittances, Institutions, and Economic Growth 401 where α i0 is a country fixed effect that does not vary over time, γ t is a period effect that is common across countries, k is the number of years lagged (which is chosen to be equal to 5 in this paper), and others are as previously denoted. While the inclusion of the country specific effect helps pick up omitted time invariant country characteristics such as geographical factors, the period specific effect will pick up omitted shocks that happened in all countries similarly, such as the ups and downs, or the business cycle, of the whole world. Similar to Dollar and Kraay (2003) , this paper employs the estimation technique developed by Caselli et al. (1996) , which transforms the level regression in equation (2) to regression in differences as follows:
This transformation presents a regression of growth of output on its own lag and on growth of different explanatory variables. This dynamic framework offers many desirable features in terms of addressing measurement errors, omitted variables, and endogeneity problems (Dollar & Kraay, 2003) . By focusing on changes in growth rates over different 5-year periods, it is expected to get more informative results about the partial effects of changes in trade, remittances, and institutions on growth. It is assumed that while trade volumes, remittance flow, and institutional quality may be correlated with the contemporaneous and lagged shocks to GDP growth, they are uncorrelated with future shocks to GDP growth. This implies that the 5-year lags of trade, remittances, and institutional quality can be used as instruments in growth regressions. It has been suggested that when estimating panel data regressions with lagged dependent variable and fixed effects, the results are subject to an estimation bias, especially when T is small. To avoid this bias, this paper employs the generalized method of moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data in which the differencing transformation above is an important first step to obtain regression results. Table 4 and 5 presents regression results using the first differenced GMM technique mentioned above. This paper starts with an unbalanced panel of 229 observations on growth in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for about 49 countries. The dependent variable is the log difference of income per capita, which captures the average annual growth if it is divided by 5, and the explanatory variables include a lag of the log difference of income per capita, log difference of education, log difference of trade as share of GDP, log difference of remittances as share of GDP, and level difference of institutional quality. All regressions include an unreported time dummy. Table 4 shows the results that are estimated by the least squares method. Although this estimation method is inconsistent and its results should be treated with caution, it helps to depict the partial correlations in the data. It can be seen that remittance share, trade share, and institutional quality are all strongly correlated with growth.
Of more interest are results shown in Table 5 where all the variables are instrumented as described above. Coefficients on trade share, remittance share, and All regressions include an unreported time dummy. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are denoted respectively by * * * , * * , and * . (2) when it stands alone. There is a qualitatively similar result when the remittances variable is also considered in equation (5). However, the coefficient on trade becomes positive in equation (6) when institutional quality is introduced and in equation (8) when all interested variables are examined simultaneously. It is quite striking that the estimated coefficient on trade variable varies dramatically across specifications, ranging from −0.305 to 0.294. Remittances are found to have a significant negative effect on growth throughout all regressions. The largest (negative) impact is found in equation (3) when the variable stands alone (without trade and institutions being considered). However, the magnitude of its coefficient is reduced somewhat when trade and institutional variables are taken into account.
The institutional variable always enters the regressions positively and significantly. Its coefficient varies from 0.083, when both trade and remittances are simultaneously examined in equation (8), to 0.095, when only the remittances variable is introduced in equation (7).
In short, dynamic panel regression results strongly confirm the effective role of changes in trade, remittances, and institutions to economic growth as found previously in cross-sectional regressions. While the impact on growth of institutions is persistently positive, the impact on growth of remittances is persistently negative, the impact of trade on growth is somehow ambiguous.
The first-stage regressions for changes in trade, remittances, and institutions in Table 6 provide interesting results. Human capital does not necessarily lead to institutional improvement, which is inconsistent with the view that high human capital growth leads to faster institutional improvement. This may be due to some mean reversion in the measure of institutions given a relatively short horizon of 5 years. There exists a negative relationship between previous trade volumes and subsequent changes in trade. This result can be explained by the fact that many developing countries opted for protectionist 'measures to protect their domestic production,' which results in a reduction in trade volumes, especially in the 1960s and 1970s (Dollar & Kraay, 2003) . This result holds even when previous institutional quality level and previous remittance share are added to the regressions. The main purpose for adding those two lagged variables to the regressions is to see whether the outcomes of trade, remittances, or institutions come first. If one factor comes first then its lagged value should strongly predict changes in the others. It can be seen that the previous values of institutional and remittances variables enter positively, however, insignificantly.
Changes in remittances also have a negative correlation with the previous value of remittances. Contrary to the results reported in Table 2 and 3, lagged trade volumes do not have strong explanatory power for remittances. The rate of change in institutional quality is negatively correlated with its previous value. This reflects the persistency in institutional economic policies. While the lagged level of trade has a very strong explanatory power for changes in institutional quality, which is consistent with the argument of Rodrik (2000) , the lagged level of remittances exerts an insignificant impact on institutions. In short, results obtained in Table 6 
Conclusions
This paper tries to explain the dynamics of income in the last 30 years in which the initial income term (in cross-sectional data) is incorporated to control for historical factors. In a large cross-section of countries, it is found that, in the long-run, growth is strongly correlated with a high level of trade and better quality of institutions but with a low level of remittances. This suggests that trade, remittances, as well as institutions are all important in understanding differences in growth rates across countries in the long run. Over shorter periods of time, the results obtained, to a certain extent, lend strong support to the above conclusion. Given that the lag of income per capita growth and the rate of change in educational level are controlled for, 5-year average growth exhibits substantial persistence with the variation in remittances and institutions. The only exception is that changes in trade share do not give an unambiguous prediction of changes in growth rates (the coefficient on trade is sometimes positive and sometimes negative). These facts imply that trade affects growth more significantly in the longer run than in the shorter run. An explanation for this outcome is as follows. In general, trade is strongly linked with common geographical and historical issues. The longer the time period is considered, the better the combined effects of trade with those geographical and historical issues on economic performance are revealed. Trade is also often affected by short-run fluctuations in exchange rate, interest rate, etc. However, those short-run movements do not necessarily lead to changes in growth as it may take longer for growth to respond.
As trade may positively affect institutions, which in turn affects growth, it can be concluded from this result that, as a policy maker, one needs to formulate appropriate policies that can strengthen both institutional quality and trade liberalization. To this end, countries should adopt policies and an institutional structure that assure effective enforcement of contracts and fair regulation of credit and labor, and allow free exchange with foreigners. While the positive role of trade and institutions towards growth has been, to some extent, established in the literature, the impact of remittances on growth, whether it is hampering or enhancing, is still controversial. The fact that the results of this paper somehow support the hypothesis that remittances might not be a stable source of capital for development because it can reduce recipients' economic incentive to work and participate in the labor market, which results in a net harmful effect on growth, is a challenging finding. If it is true, it is hard to think about appropriate policies to limit its adverse effect on growth without a more thorough analysis of the relationship between remittances and economic development. Because this is just the beginning of telling a story, it is expected that more research works will be devoted to this interesting topic in the future.
